

“SHORT-TERM DEBT AND FINANCIAL CRISES:
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM U.S.
TREASURY SUPPLY”

BY KRISHNAMURTHY AND VISSING-JORGENSEN

Hui Chen

MIT and NBER

The Fourth FARFE Conference

SUMMARY


- Theory: Non-financial sector demand for safe and liquid assets drives the short-term debt issued by financial sector.
- Predictions:
 - Increase in Treasury supply decreases the net supply of short-term debt and the net long-term investment by the financial sector.
 - Increase in Treasury supply increases checkable deposits.
 - Reduction in Treasury supply increases the expenditure share of “credit” goods.
- Accounting for the impact of Treasury supply on bank money helps resolve the “missing money” puzzle.

I. WHAT LED TO OR ACCOMPANIED THOSE MAJOR CHANGES IN TREASURY SUPPLY?


- Wars
- Recessions
- Inflation, internet boom

⇒ History of the United States public debt


WWI: 1914-18




HARDING PRESIDENCY: 1920-23




GREAT DEPRESSION: 1929-1933




WWII: 1939-1945




RECESSION: 1974-75, 1980-81




REAGAN PRESIDENCY: 1981-89




GULF WAR-RECESSION: 1990-91



CLINTON PRESIDENCY: 1993-2001



GREAT RECESSION: 2007-09



WARS AND RECESSIONS

- “Crowding out” during war periods:
 - Is the government’s war-time policy “crowding out” private economic activities?
 - Economic and political uncertainty discourages financial sectors from taking on high leverage?
 - Compare across wars? For example, Korean War and Vietnam War were largely financed by taxation and not public debt.


WARS AND RECESSIONS

- “Crowding out” during war periods:
 - Is the government’s war-time policy “crowding out” private economic activities?
 - Economic and political uncertainty discourages financial sectors from taking on high leverage?
 - Compare across wars? For example, Korean War and Vietnam War were largely financed by taxation and not public debt.
- Recessions:
 - Results are robust after controlling for past GDP growth or dropping financial crisis.
 - Durable consumption (“credit” goods) is pro-cyclical.
 - What about leading indicators of business cycles? (Term spread, Baa-Aaa spread, housing starts ...)

Table 6. Three additional approaches to address endogeneity concerns**Panel A. Controls for loan demand. Dropping most problematic years.**


	Dependent variable: Net short-term debt(t)/GDP(t)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Govt. supply(t)/GDP(t)	-0.486 (-5.02)	-0.309 (-4.81)	-0.320 (-5.48)	-0.556 (-5.03)	-0.487 (-5.67)	-0.516 (-4.84)
Real GDP(t)/Real GDP(t-5)		-0.094 (-2.20)				
Primary deficit/GDP, year t-4 to t				0.119 (1.36)		
Primary deficit/GDP, year t+1 to t+5				-0.053 (-0.83)		
Year	0.005 (4.49)	0.007 (9.24)	0.007 (10.82)	0.004 (4.85)	0.004 (4.59)	0.004 (2.90)
R ²	0.853	0.928	0.923	0.900	0.886	0.878
Sample	1914- 2011	1934- 2011	As (2)	1918- 2004	As (4)	Drop year t to t+9 after financial crisis

II. WHAT ABOUT CORPORATE DEBT?



- Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2013): Increase in leverage from 1946 to 1970 for all unregulated industries and firms of all sizes → Is it about safe assets or credit in general?

II. WHAT ABOUT CORPORATE DEBT?



- Greenwood, Hanson, Stein (2010): Firms act as macro liquidity providers, filling government debt maturity gap.

III. THE DEMAND SIDE

- Demand for safe assets changes over time.
 - If Treasury supply is relatively inelastic, a spike in demand should result in a spike in the Treasury specialness (e.g., AAA-Treasury spread, Repo-Treasury spread).
 - Does Treasury specialness predict future increase in financial intermediary short-term debt?


III. THE DEMAND SIDE

- Demand for safe assets changes over time.
 - If Treasury supply is relatively inelastic, a spike in demand should result in a spike in the Treasury specialness (e.g., AAA-Treasury spread, Repo-Treasury spread).
 - Does Treasury specialness predict future increase in financial intermediary short-term debt? → It depends; Treasury specialness might be a sign of financial intermediary distress.

III. THE DEMAND SIDE

- Demand for safe assets changes over time.
 - If Treasury supply is relatively inelastic, a spike in demand should result in a spike in the Treasury specialness (e.g., AAA-Treasury spread, Repo-Treasury spread).
 - Does Treasury specialness predict future increase in financial intermediary short-term debt? → It depends; Treasury specialness might be a sign of financial intermediary distress.
- Demand elasticity might also change over time (e.g., due to foreign demand).
 - The sensitivity of the private supply of short-term debt to Treasury supply will then change as well.


3-MTH GCF REPO RATE – TREASURY



IV. COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROWDING-IN

- Holmstrom and Tirole (1998): Treasury as complementary input into the production process.
 - Applies to financial intermediaries, too.
- Weymuller (2013): Banks can create more safe assets by holding treasuries and risky assets.
 - European evidence

IV. COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROWDING-IN



Weymuller (2013)

CONCLUSION

- This is a very exciting research agenda.
- How to deal with wars and recessions?
- Additional predictions:
 - demand effects
 - complementarity and crowding-in